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Exploiting Full-duplex Receivers for Achieving
Secret Communications in Multiuser MISO
Networks
Berk Akgun, O. Ozan Koyluoglu, and Marwan Krunz
Abstract
We consider a broadcast channel, in which a multi-antenna transmitter (Alice) sends K confidential information
signals to K legitimate users (Bobs) in the presence of L eavesdroppers (Eves). Alice uses MIMO precoding to
generate the information signals along with her own (Tx-based) friendly jamming. Interference at each Bob is
removed by MIMO zero-forcing. This, however, leaves a “vulnerability region” around each Bob, which can be
exploited by a nearby Eve. We address this problem by augmenting Tx-based friendly jamming (TxFJ) with Rx-
based friendly jamming (RxFJ), generated by each Bob. Specifically, each Bob uses self-interference suppression
(SIS) to transmit a friendly jamming signal while simultaneously receiving an information signal over the same
channel. We minimize the powers allocated to the information, TxFJ, and RxFJ signals under given guarantees on
the individual secrecy rate for each Bob. The problem is solved for the cases when the eavesdropper’s channel state
information is known/unknown. Simulations show the effectiveness of the proposed solution. Furthermore, we discuss
how to schedule transmissions when the rate requirements need to be satisfied on average rather than instantaneously.
Under special cases, a scheduling algorithm that serves only the strongest receivers is shown to outperform the one
that schedules all receivers.
Index terms
Broadcast channel, channel correlation, friendly jamming, full-duplex, physical layer security
I. INTRODUCTION
As wireless systems continue to proliferate, confidentiality of their communications becomes one of the main
concerns due to the broadcast nature of the wireless medium. Cryptographic techniques can be utilized to address
these concerns, but such techniques often assume adversaries with limited computational capabilities. Physical
(PHY) layer security, on the other hand, can be implemented regardless of the adversary’s computational power. It
also takes advantage of the characteristics of the wireless medium.
The authors are with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, 85721.
E-mail: {berkakgun, ozan, krunz}@email.arizona.edu
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TCOMM.2016.2641949
0090-6778 c© 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
March 3, 2018 DRAFT
2A. Related Work
The origins of PHY-layer security dates back to the pioneering work of Wyner [1] that studied the concept of
secrecy capacity for the degraded wiretap channel. The authors in [2] extended Wyner’s work to non-degraded
discrete memoryless broadcast channels. Later on, the secrecy capacity of MIMO (multiple-input multiple-output)
wiretap channel was obtained in [3]. The secrecy region of the Gaussian MIMO broadcast channel was studied
in [4], [5], and [6]. The authors in [7] and [8] studied the problem of secure communications over broadcast
channels under individual secrecy constraint, which guarantees that the information leakage to eavesdroppers from
each information message vanishes. Even though the joint secrecy constraint, which ensures that the information
leakage to eavesdroppers from all information messages vanishes, is stronger than the individual one, it is not
always possible to satisfy. Moreover, the individual secrecy constraint still offers an acceptable secrecy level,
while increasing transmission rates [7]. To facilitate secrecy, Goel and Negi [9] introduced the concept of artificial
noise, a.k.a. friendly jamming (FJ), for Gaussian channels. The idea is to artificially generate Gaussian noise over
the channel in order to degrade eavesdropping. The legitimate receivers remain unaffected, as the FJ signals are
generated to be orthogonal to their channels, utilizing the MIMO precoder techniques. This is a special case
of the channel prefixing technique proposed in [2], which randomizes the codewords before sending them over
the channel. The authors in [10] studied a multiuser broadcast channel where a sender transmits K independent
streams to K receivers. Linear precoding and FJ techniques were proposed to enhance PHY-layer security. The
authors in [11] studied an outage probability based power allocation problem for data and FJ so as to satisfy certain
secrecy requirements. A full-duplex (FD) receiver that sends FJ to secure the communication was considered in
[12] and [13]. Their work was later extended to allow both transmitter and receiver to generate FJ in [14]. In that
model, at least two antennas were needed at the receiver, one for sending the FJ signal and the other to receive
the information message. A similar system model was used in [15] where one of the antennas at the receiver is
utilized to receive information signals, and the remaining ones generate FJ signals. The authors in [16] extended
this work to a MIMO system where r antennas of the receiver are selected to receive information signals, while the
remaining antennas generate FJ signals. The authors in [17] showed that PHY-layer secrecy can be enhanced using
FD jamming receivers without assuming perfect self-interference suppression (SIS). Another system model with
one FD base station (BS), one transmitter, one receiver, and one eavesdropper was considered in [18]. In this model,
the BS receives a message from the transmitter, while sending an information message to the receiver together with
an FJ signal. It was assumed that the transmitter’s signal does not interfere at the receiver, and the problem of
maximizing the secret transmission rate was investigated. This work was extended to a multiuser communication
system with multiple single-antenna uplink and downlink users and multi-antenna eavesdoppers by the authors in
[19]. They formulated a multi-objective optimization problem to minimize the total downlink and uplink transmit
power, while guarenteeing both uplink and downlink security. In their model, the only FJ source was the FD BS, and
zero-forcing beamforming was employed for uplink transmissions. The authors in [20] considered an FD two-way
secure communication system where two FD sources are equipped with multiple transmit antennas and a single
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3receive antenna in the presence of a single-antenna eavesdropper. Remarkably, the sources in this model do not
employ FJ signals to further impair the eavesdropper’s channel. None of these works considered a multiuser scenario
where multiple receivers generate FJ signals. In contrast, here, we consider a K-user scenario with single-antenna
FD receivers that generate FJ signals. Furthermore, we consider a scenario where the information signals should
not be decoded at unintended receivers (confidential messages), and the information leakage to eavesdroppers (they
may be system devices that are not necessarily malicious, but “untrusted”) for each information message should
vanish (individual secrecy). Multiuser broadcast channels even without any FJ signal lead to non-convex problem
formulations due to interference from unintended information signals. When FJ signals are incorporated to the
system to provide secure communications against eavesdroppers, the problem becomes harder to deal with. The
joint power allocation among FJ signals (that are generated both at the transmitter and K receivers) and information
signals for K simultaneous transmissions has not been explored previously. In addition, we specifically focus on a
problem which arises from eavesdroppers whose channels are correlated with those of legitimate receivers. A similar
system model was considered in [21], where the BS sends two independent data streams to only two legitimate
receivers in the presence of a multi-antenna eavesdropper. In that work, we developed a secrecy encoding scheme
to construct the information signals under joint secrecy constraints. We also characterized the achievable sum-rate,
and investigated a special case of the corresponding optimization problem.
B. Motivation and Contributions
Our work is motivated by recent studies that showed the vulnerability of the intended receiver to adversaries
in its proximity [22] and [23]. In particular, when the eavesdropper’s channel is highly correlated with that of
a legitimate receiver, MIMO-based nullification of the transmitter’s FJ signal at that receiver, a.k.a. zero-forcing
beamforming (ZFBF), extends to nearby eavesdroppers. This increases the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio
(SINR) at the eavesdroppers (Eves), significantly reducing the secrecy rate. The goal of our work is to provide
message confidentiality, independent of the amount of correlations between the channel state information (CSI) at
Eve and the intended receiver. We consider a scenario where the transmitter (Alice) sends K independent confidential
messages to K legitimate receivers (Bobs). To achieve message confidentiality, we propose to use receiver-based
friendly jamming (RxFJ) along with transmitter-based friendly jamming (TxFJ). This way, Eve’s received signal is
degraded even if her CSI is highly correlated with those of Bobs. To remove TxFJ at each Bob, ZFBF is employed
by Alice. This technique also provides confidentiality for the information messages (information signals are zero-
forced at unintended receivers). Even though ZFBF technique is a suboptimal solution for broadcast channels, it
significantly reduces the implementation complexity [24], [25]. In fact for multiuser MIMO channels, ZFBF is
asymptotically optimal in high SNR regimes, e.g. 10 dB, and in some low SNR regimes, in terms of throughput
maximization as well as power minimization [24]. Moreover, as the number of users becomes very large, the
sum-rate performance of ZFBF is close to optimal [25].
We formulate an optimization problem to minimize the total power consumption for the information, TxFJ, and
RxFJ signals, while guaranteeing a certain individual secrecy rate for each Bob with/without Eve’s CSI (ECSI). (In
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4unknown ECSI case, it is assumed that the first- and the second-order statistics of ECSI are known). We exploit
the conditions where using RxFJ together with TxFJ has better system performance than using only TxFJ or ZFBF
in terms of preventing information leakage to Eves.
The contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
• We show that FD capabilities can be exploited in multiuser MISO (multiple-input single-output) networks to
provide confidential communications using RxFJ against eavesdroppers, whose channels are correlated with
that of legitimate receivers.
• We investigate the joint power allocation problem for information, TxFJ, and RxFJ signals to satisfy certain
secrecy rate requirements, and provide optimal solutions for practical systems.
• We determine the optimal randomization rates for wiretap coding to confuse the eavesdroppers based on the
given requirements (individual secrecy rate requirement if ECSI is known, and secrecy outage probability
requirement if only the statistics of ECSI are known).
• We analyze the effect of different scheduling approaches on the performance of the proposed schemes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the system model. In Section III, we
present different beamforming (BF) techniques for scenarios with known/unknown ECSI. Optimization problem
is formulated and analyzed in Section IV. We provide simulation results and propose a scheduling scheme in
Section V. The paper is concluded in Section VI. (The published version of this work can be found in [26].)
Throughout the paper, we adopt the following notation. Vectors and matrices are denoted by bold lower-case and
upper-case letters, respectively. We use column and row vectors notations interchangeably. (·)∗ and (·)T represent
the complex conjugate transpose and the transpose of a vector or matrix, respectively. Frobenius norm and the
absolute value of a real or complex number are denoted by ‖ · ‖ and | · |, respectively. E[·] indicates the expectation
of a random variable. A ∈ CM×N means that A is an M × N complex matrix. CN (µ, σ2) denotes complex
circularly symmetric Gaussian random variable with mean µ and variance σ2. IN represents an N × N identity
matrix. [x]+ = max(x, 0). rank(A) indicates the rank of matrix A. I(X ;Y ) refers to the mutual information
between random variables X and Y . Let A and B be two sets. Then, {A \ B} indicates the set of all elements of
A that are not in B. For simplicity, log2(.) is referred to as log(.) in the rest of the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
As shown in Figure 1, we consider a MU-MISO (multiuser MISO) network in which Alice transmits K
independent confidential data streams to K receivers in the presence of L eavesdroppers. B = {B1, B2, · · · , BK}
is the set of legitimate receivers, each has a single-antenna FD radio (the same antenna is used to simultaneously
transmit and receive signals over the same frequency) [27]. E = {E1, E2, · · · , EL} is the set of eavesdroppers,
each of which has a single-antenna. Legitimate receivers and eavesdroppers are referred to as Bobs and Eves in the
rest of the paper, respectively. Let the number of antennas at Alice be NA. Let xA ∈ CNA×1 be Alice’s transmit
signal. xBk denotes the transmit signal from the kth Bob, Bk, ∀k ∈ K, where K represents the set {1, · · · ,K}
throughout the paper, i.e., K = {1, · · · ,K}. Similarly, L denotes the set {1, · · · , L} in the rest of the paper.
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Fig. 1: MU-MISO system model with both TxFJ and RxFJ.
The signals received by the kth Bob and the ith Eve at time t ∈ {1, · · · , n} are, respectively, given by:
ytBk = hABkx
t
A +
√
αhBkBkx
t
Bk
+
∑
l∈{K\k}
hBlBkx
t
Bl
+ ntBk , ∀k ∈ K (1)
ztEi = hAEix
t
A +
∑
k∈K
hBkEix
t
Bk
+ ntEi , ∀i ∈ L (2)
where hABk ∈ C1×NA is the channel vector between Alice and the kth Bob ∀k ∈ K, while hAEi ∈ C1×NA is the
channel vector between Alice and the ith Eve ∀i ∈ L. hBkEi denotes the channel between the kth Bob ∀k ∈ K
and the ith Eve ∀i ∈ L. hBkBk and hBlBk represent the self-interference channel at the kth Bob ∀k ∈ K and the
channel between the lth and kth Bob ∀l ∈ {K\ k}, respectively. The channel hij , i ∈ {A∪B} and j ∈ {B∪E}, is
equal to
√
Dijgij , where Dij and gij ∼ CN (0, INA) represent the path loss component and small-scale effects of
the channel, respectively. Since FD radio design is considered at the receivers, a residual self-interference term is
incorporated into the model. This residual term defines the portion of the self-interference left after suppression, and
is denoted with the scale factor α ∈ [0, 1], e.g. α = 0 means full-suppression (ideal case). nBk ∼ CN (0, N0) and
nEi ∼ CN (0, N0) represent AWGN (Additive White Gaussian Noise) at the kth Bob and the ith Eve, respectively.
We impose the following instantaneous power constraints:
E[x∗AxA] ≤ P¯A (3)
E[ |xBk |2] ≤ P¯Bk , ∀k ∈ K (4)
where P¯A and P¯Bk ’s are given constants.
An achievable individual secrecy rate tuple is defined as R = (R1, R2, · · · , RK) if there exists codebooks
(2nRk , n) which satisfy both the reliability and security constraints. Let Wk define the secure message from Alice
to the kth Bob Bk where Wk ∈ Wk = [1 : 2nRk ]. The reliability of the transmission is given as:
Pr(Wˆk 6= Wk) ≤ ǫ0 (5)
March 3, 2018 DRAFT
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sequences in n channel uses at the lth Bob and the ith Eve, respectively. Accordingly, the individual secrecy
constraints at Bobs and Eves are given by:
I(Wk; Y
n
Bl
) ≤ ǫ1, ∀(k, l) ∈ (K × {K \ k}) (6)
I(Wk; Z
n
Ei
) ≤ ǫ2, ∀(k, i) ∈ (K × L) (7)
where ǫ1 → 0 and ǫ2 → 0 as n → ∞. The first secrecy constraint, (6), ensures the message confidentiality
in an individual manner (a.k.a., individual secrecy), i.e., each information signal should have minimal leakage at
unintended Bobs. The second one, (7), provides the individual secrecy against external Eves. Note that the individual
secrecy constraints are considered throughout this paper rather than the joint secrecy constraints. Furthermore, we
consider a scenario where Eves do not collude. Let snk represents the codeword in the codebook to be transmitted
in n channel uses. This signal has to contain enough randomness such that the mutual information leakage to
Eves will vanish to satisfy (7). Therefore, the secret codebook is generated as follows. 2n(Rk+Rxk) sequences are
independently generated according to a certain probability distribution, where Rxk defines the randomization rate.
Then, these sequences are distributed into 2nRk bins, where the bin index is defined by Wk . Correspondingly, each
bin has 2nRxk codewords. Let W xk define the index of the codewords in each bin. As a result, each codeword is
represented by two indices, i.e., snk (Wk,W xk ). In the rest of the paper, we will require I(Sk;YBk) ≥ Rk + Rxk to
reliably decode secure message and randomization at Bk ∀k ∈ K, and I(Sk;ZEi) ≤ Rxk ∀(k, i) ∈ (K × L) to
achieve message security in the sense of individual secrecy. (Note that the randomization decoding is necessary to
remove ambiguity in the codewords to reveal the secret messages at Bobs. In addition, this adequate amount of
randomization implies the security of the message. This is the well-known Wyner’s wiretap code [1], specialized to
the individual secrecy notion studied in this paper.) The secrecy constraint (6), on the other hand, will be satisfied
via ZFBF technique employed at Alice.
The general signaling scheme that we consider in this paper is given by:
xtA =
∑
k∈K
vks
t
k(Wk,W
x
k ) +
∑
m∈M
v(j)m j
t
m, t = {1, 2, · · · , n} (8)
where M = {1, · · · ,M}. stk ∼ CN (0, PSk) is the information signal for the kth Bob at time t, and vk ∈ CNA×1
is its normalized BF vector such that v∗kvk = 1. jtm ∼ CN (0, P (j)m ) and v(j)m ∈ CNA×1 are the mth TxFJ signal at
time t and its BF vector, respectively. M is the number of independent TxFJ signals, and it will be explained later
in detail. v(j)m is a unit vector as well. The RxFJ signal transmitted by the kth Bob is given by xBk = jBk , where
jBk ∼ CN (0, PBk), ∀k ∈ K.
III. BEAMFORMING SCHEMES
In this section, we will discuss beamforming schemes that satisfy the individual secrecy constraints in (6) and
(7). We employ a well-known ZFBF technique, which allows to cancel out any signal at any receiver given its CSI,
to prevent Bobs to decode the unintended information signals given that Alice knows CSI from all Bobs to herself.
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7For multiuser MIMO channels, ZFBF technique is asymptotically optimal both in the high SNR regimes, e.g. 10dB,
and in some low SNR regimes in terms of throughput maximization as well as power minimization [24]. In addition,
sum-rate performance of ZFBF is close to optimal, as the number of users is very large [25]. The performance
gap between ZFBF and the optimal solution is, indeed, reduced when the confidentiality constraint is imposed (the
capacity of a system with confidentiality constraints is less than the one without confidentiality constraints). At the
same time, employing ZFBF for multiuser MIMO channels reduces design complexity (even though the optimal
precoding design is tractable for such systems, the matrix computations and iterations in the optimization process
still cause a practicability concern for real time systems). The inter-user interference is also removed by ZFBF.
That is, the multiuser MISO channel reduces to a single user MISO channel from the standpoint of each Bob
(with the cost of reduced degree of freedom (DoF) for the information signals). The authors in [28] considered a
MISO channel with a single antenna eavesdropper, and characterized the optimal achievable secrecy rates under the
assumption that the Gaussian signaling is used for the information signals. They concluded that “the beamforming
direction of the information signals should be adjusted to be as orthogonal to the eavesdropping channel direction
as possible, while being as close to the main channel direction as possible”. By inspiring from this result, we will
investigate the following, possibly suboptimal, beamforming schemes to provide security against Eves. In Section
III-A, the information signals are transmitted to an orthogonal space to the CSI of the unintended Bobs and Eves,
and no TxFJ/RxFJ signal is utilized. On the other hand, in Section III-B, we consider a beamforming scheme
where the kth information signal snk (Wk,W xk ) is transmitted in the direction of the kth Bob’s channel, and TxFJ
signals are utilized with and without the knowledge of ECSI. Later in the sequel, we will discuss the vulnerabilities
of Tx-based beamforming schemes when the channels of Bobs and Eves are correlated. To do that, we utilize
asymptotically optimal beamforming schemes with low complexity. (Finding optimal beamforming schemes for the
given setup is not the scope of this paper.)
A. ZFBF
Here, it is assumed that the ECSI is known to Alice and Bobs. This assumption will be discussed later in Section
IV. Without any friendly jamming signal, it is ensured that Eves are not able to receive any information regarding
messages employing ZFBF. All of the information signals are canceled out at Eves and unintended Bobs. Therefore,
security constraints given in (6) and (7) are satisfied, where Rxk is set to 0 (no need to use randomization rate as
Eves do not receive any information signals). Correspondingly, the transmit signal at Alice is given by:
xtA =
∑
k∈K
vks
t
k(Wk,W
x
k ) (9)
To implement ZFBF technique, precoding vector, vk, is designed such that Eves and Bobs except Bk do not receive
the information signal, sk. Let us define the joint channel matrix from Alice to these receivers as
HˆBk = [h
T
AB1
· · ·hTABk−1hTABk+1 · · ·hTABKhTAE1 · · ·hTAEL ]T . (10)
Let the singular value decomposition (SVD) of this matrix be HˆBk = UˆBkΣˆBkVˆ∗Bk . (The SVD of an m × n
matrix A has a form UΣV∗, where Σ is an m× n rectangular diagonal matrix with the singular values of A on
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8the diagonal. U and V are m ×m and n× n unitary matrices, and the columns of these matrices are called the
left- and right-singular vectors of A, respectively.) We assume that NA > (L +K − 1) (the number of columns
of this matrix is larger than the number of its rows). Let U1 denote rank(HˆBk). (U1 = (L+K − 1) if HˆBk is a
full-rank matrix.) Let Vˆ(2)Bk correspond to the last (NA − U1) columns of VˆBk . Then, Vˆ
(2)
Bk
forms an orthogonal
basis for the null space of HˆBk . Using this decomposition, we set the precoder as vk = Vˆ
(2)
Bk
v
(2)
k (v(2)k will be
explained shortly). This way, Eves and the unintended Bobs will not be able to receive sk, since it will be nullified
at them, i.e., HˆBkvk = 0 where 0 is a zero vector. On the other hand, the new channel seen by the receiver
Bk becomes (hABkVˆ
(2)
Bk
) ∈ C1×(NA−U1). Note that this reduces to an interference free channel. To maximize the
received signal power over this channel, the second part of the precoder (i.e., v(2)k ) should be designed as follows.
Let the SVD of the new channel vector be (hABkVˆ
(2)
Bk
) = UnewΣnewV
∗
new . The first column of Vnew forms an
orthogonal basis for the range space of the new channel. Consequently, the second part of the precoder is chosen
in this range space. Indeed, this vector is given by the following equation:
v
(2)
k =
(hABkVˆ
(2)
Bk
)∗
‖hABkVˆ(2)Bk‖
(11)
Overall, the precoding vector is designed as:
vk = Vˆ
(2)
Bk
(hABkVˆ
(2)
Bk
)∗
‖hABkVˆ(2)Bk‖
(12)
Based on this scheme, the received signals at Bk and Ei reduce to:
ynBk = hABkvks
n
k (Wk,W
x
k ) + n
n
Bk
, ∀k ∈ K (13)
znEi = n
n
Ei
, ∀i ∈ L (14)
For the environments where Line-of-Sight (LOS) propagation model is more dominant, channels between the
transmitter and the receivers are more likely to be correlated, especially if the receivers are close to each other,
e.g., distances between them are shorter than 19 wavelengths [29] (19 wavelengths is approximately equal to 1
and 2 meters for 2.4 and 5 GHz carrier frequencies, respectively). Let us consider a scenario where one of Eves
is near one of Bobs. (Such a scenario can be easily observed in conference rooms, theaters, public transportation,
concert halls, restaurants, stadiums etc.) Therefore, when the information signal that is intended to the given Bob
is canceled out at the given Eve using ZFBF, the same signal also becomes very weak or even canceled out at this
Bob as well. This brings about a vulnerability issue for the designs that rely on ZFBF. In particular, for the case
of correlation between hAEi and hABk =
√
DABkgABk with parameter ρ ∈ [0, 1], the following equation holds:
hAEi =
√
DAEi(ρgABk +
√
1− ρ2gAEi) (15)
where gABk and gAEi are independent, i.e., hAEi =
√
DAEigAEi if there is no correlation. hAEivk = 0 due to
ZFBF. Accordingly,
√
DAEi(ρgABk +
√
1− ρ2gAEi)vk = 0 (16)
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√
1− ρ2gAEivk = 0 (17)
gABkvk =
−
√
1− ρ2
ρ
gAEivk (18)
As a result, hABkvk =
√
DABkgABkvk = −
√
DABk
√
1− ρ2
ρ
gAEivk . Therefore, as ρ tends to 1, hABkvk → 0,
which means that the information signal intended to the kth Bob becomes very weak at this Bob.
B. Cooperative FJ
Using the proposed scheme detailed in the previous subsection, communication rates of Bobs are maximized after
imposing the zero-forcing constraints to cancel out the information signals at Eves and unintended Bobs. However,
the antenna constraint required by the previous strategy (NA > L+K−1) may not be always satisfied. Specifically,
the number of Eves may be very large such that L +K − 1 > NA. Moreover, even if this constraint is satisfied,
having a large number of Eves may cause a very poor system performance (in terms of secrecy sum-rate or total
transmit power). Having more Eves results in more constraints, and the number of available dimensions at Alice
to beamform the information signals to the intended Bobs (diversity gain) decreases.
In this section, we propose a strategy that requires zero-forcing constraints only for unintended Bobs. Thus,
the security constraint given in (6) is satisfied as previously explained. To satisfy (7), Alice sends TxFJ signals
such that they are canceled out at Bobs by ZFBF, and their signal strength at Eves is maximized. This way, Bobs
are not affected by the TxFJ signals, and the channels of Eves become weaker. Applying ZFBF to TxFJ signals
is a well-known technique. This concept has been studied for various single- and multi-user scenarios since the
pioneering work of Goel and Negi ( [9], [11], [14], [15], [17], [30], [31]). We follow the same precoder design for
TxFJ signals done in the aforementioned papers. This technique only requires the constraint NA > K rather than
NA > (L +K − 1).
Based on the proposed scheme, the transmitted signal at Alice is given by (8). The precoders of the information
signals are designed as follows. Let us define
HˆBk = [h
T
AB1
· · ·hTABk−1hTABk+1 · · ·hTABK ]T , ∀k ∈ K (19)
Let the SVD of this matrix be HˆBk = UˆBkΣˆBkVˆ∗Bk . We assume that NA > (K − 1), and rank(HˆBk) = U2. Let
Vˆ
(2)
Bk
correspond to the last (NA − U2) columns of VˆBk . Then, Vˆ(2)Bk forms an orthogonal basis for the null space
of HˆBk . By following the same steps as we did in the previous section, the precoders of the information signals
are given as:
vk = Vˆ
(2)
Bk
(hABkVˆ
(2)
Bk
)∗
‖hABkVˆ(2)Bk‖
, ∀k ∈ K (20)
The precoding design of TxFJ signals is as follows. First, let us define
HAB = [h
T
AB1
· · ·hTABK ]T (21)
Let the SVD of this matrix be HAB = UABΣABV∗AB . We assume that NA > K , and rank(HAB) = U3. (U3 = K
if HAB is a full-rank matrix). Let V(2)AB correspond to the last (NA−U3) columns of VAB . Then, V(2)AB forms an
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orthogonal basis for the null space of HAB . As a result, each column of V(2)AB corresponds to the precoder of an
independent TxFJ signal so that the null space of the channel matrix between Alice and Bobs is fully covered by
TxFJ signals. This also implies that M = NA − U3. If V(2)AB(m) represents the mth column of that matrix, TxFJ
signal precoders are given by:
v(j)m = V
(2)
AB(m), ∀m ∈ {1, · · · , NA − U3} (22)
The precoder design of the information and TxFJ signals does not rely on the knowledge of ECSI. In the rest
of the paper, the same precoders will be used in both cases where ECSI is known or unknown. Note that these
precoders are unit vectors in the corresponding directions. How to allocate power for these signals in the given
directions will be discussed in the next section.
For scenarios in which LOS propogation is dominant (like the previous scenario), let us assume that one of Eves
and one of Bobs are close to each other so that their channels are highly correlated. Then, as the TxFJ signals are
zero-forced at Bob, their effect becomes weak or even vanished at the given Eve as well (we discussed a similar
scenario in the previous subsection). At the same time, the information signal intended to the given Bob is sent
in the direction of his channel after being zero-forced at unintended Bobs. This is a maximum-ratio combining
(MRC) precoder design, which maximizes SINR at the given receiver, with a zero-forcing constraint. This precoder
is expressed as follows:
vk =argmax
v
(hABkv) = argmax
v
(gABkv) (23)
s.t. HˆBkv = 0 (24)
In the case of channel correlation between hAEi and hABk , hAEi =
√
DAEi(ρgABk +
√
1− ρ2gAEi) as discussed
earlier. The multiplication of hAEi and vk becomes:
hAEivk =
√
DAEiρgABkvk +
√
DAEi
√
1− ρ2gAEivk (25)
vk maximizes the first term of hAEi . However, if ρ is low, this term will be negligible. On the other hand, if
ρ is significantly larger than
√
1− ρ2, the first term will be dominant. Due to these two reasons, SINR at Eve
increases in the case of high channel correlation. To overcome this problem, we utilize FD communications. In
our model, Bobs are capable of transmitting and receiving signals over the same frequency band at the same time.
As a result, we propose sending RxFJ signals from Bobs. That is, while TxFJ ensures that Eves (whose channels
are uncorrelated with Bobs) are jammed, RxFJ aims to keep the vicinity of Bobs secure. Besides, whenever a new
Bob is served by Alice, one TxFJ dimension is sacrificed. However, the total number of dimensions occupied by
TxFJ and RxFJ remains the same, when this Bob generates his own RxFJ. This is an important point, as more
dimensions allow to design more effective friendly jamming signals.
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IV. OPTIMAL POWER ALLOCATION
A. Known ECSI
In this section, we consider a problem that aims to minimize the total power allocated to the information, TxFJ,
and RxFJ signals while maintaining certain secrecy rate requirements. These requirements ensure that the mutual
information between the information signal, Sk, and the received signal at the intended receiver, YBk , is above a
certain threshold, Rk +Rxk (sum of the individual secrecy rate and the randomization rate of sk) ∀k ∈ K, and the
mutual information between the information signal, Sk, and the received signal at the ith Eve, ZEi , is below a
certain threshold, Rxk (the randomization rate of sk) ∀k ∈ K and ∀i ∈ L. Furthermore, we assume that the power
constraints given in (3) and (4) still need to be satisfied.
Here, we assume that Alice knows the channels between herself and all the receivers including Eves, and the
channels between each receiver pair (including the channels between Bobs and Eves). This assumption holds for a
network where Alice is a BS, and Bobs and Eves are active and idle system devices, respectively. IEEE 802.11ac
is a well-suited standard for this system model, as it allows multiuser downlink transmission through beamforming.
An instance of our setup consists of K +L legitimate receivers, where Alice is capable of serving only K of them
simultaneously. For example, the maximum number of concurrent transmissions in 802.11ac is 4 (i.e., K ≤ 4).
At the beginning of each transmission block (or, coherence interval), Alice can acquire the CSI of all K + L
receivers to decide which K of them will be served. The channel estimation is performed via explicit or implicit
beamforming in 802.11ac systems. Explicit beamforming relies on packet exchanges between Alice and receivers.
Specifically, Alice transmits an NDP (Null Data Packet) following the NDP announcement message. Then, the first
receiver sends its feedback to Alice, providing its estimate of the CSI. After that, Alice polls the other receivers
successively, and they send their feedback to Alice similarly. This way, the CSI between Alice and receivers is
extracted. Alternatively, Alice can estimate the CSI of any receiver based on known fields (e.g., preambles) of its
current transmissions. This method is called implicit beamforming, and relies on channel reciprocity. After CSI
acquisition, each of the K receivers (Bobs) that are selected to be served receives a message that should be kept
confidential from the other K + L − 1 receivers. Therefore, even though the receivers in this system model are
not necessarily malicious, they are “untrusted”. For instance, these receivers may be compromised or hacked by
an external attacker. Information-theoretic security of these K information messages is guaranteed by zero-forcing
precoding against K − 1 Bobs. The remaining L idle receivers that are not selected to be served are treated as
eavesdroppers but with known CSI.
Another instance of our setup involves multiple adjacent 802.11ac networks. Users belonging to any adjacent
network can be treated as external eavesdroppers from the standpoint of the given network (again, they may be
compromised). The packets sent by these users include known 802.11ac headers, and may be overheard by Alice.
Accordingly, Alice can estimate the CSI between her and these adjacent users using implicit beamforming.
Likewise, the CSI between each receiver pair (Bob-Bob) and eavesdropper-receiver pair (Eve-Bob) can be
estimated through implicit beamforming. For example, any transmitted message from Bob and Eve includes short-
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and long-training sequences (which are a part of the known preamble) that facilitate channel estimation. Therefore,
any Bob can estimate the channels from the other Bobs and between Eves and the given Bob by overhearing and
processing these messages. Alice can then acquire the estimated CSI by polling each Bob.
Consequently, the problem formulation is given by:
minimize
PSk ∀k∈K
P (j)m ∀m∈M
PBk ∀k∈K
∑
k∈K
PSk +
∑
m∈M
P (j)m +
∑
k∈K
PBk (26a)
s.t.
∑
k∈K
PSk +
∑
m∈M
P (j)m ≤ P¯A (26b)
PBk ≤ P¯Bk , ∀k ∈ K (26c)
I(Sk;YBk) ≥ Rk +Rxk, ∀k ∈ K (26d)
I(Sk;ZEi) ≤ Rxk, ∀k ∈ K, ∀i ∈ L (26e)
where K = {1, · · · ,K}, M = {1, · · · , NA−U3}, and L = {1, · · · , L}. Given the communication scheme described
in the previous section, the mutual information between Sk and YBk is given by:
I(Sk;YBk) = log(1 + SINRBk), ∀k ∈ K (27)
where
SINRBk =
PSk |hABkvk|2
αPBk |hBkBk |2 +
∑
l∈{K\k} PBl |hBlBk |2 +N0
.
Similarly, the mutual information between Sk and ZEi is given by:
I(Sk;ZEi) = log(1 +
PSk |hAEivk|2
A+B + C +N0
), ∀k ∈ K, ∀i ∈ L (28)
where A =
∑
l∈{K\k} PSl |hAEivl|2, B =
∑
m∈M P
(j)
m |hAEiv(j)m |2, and C =
∑
k∈K PBk |hBkEi |2. A, B, and C
are the interference terms due to other information, TxFJ, and RxFJ signals, respectively. Note that the interfering
information signals help each other by decreasing the SINR at each Eve, as we consider the individual secrecy
rates. Based on (27) and (28), the constraints in (26d) and (26e) are given by:
PSk |hABkvk|2 ≥ (2Rk+R
x
k − 1)(αPBk |hBkBk |2 +
∑
l∈{K\k}
PBl |hBlBk |2 +N0), ∀k ∈ K (29)
PSk |hAEivk|2 ≤ (2R
x
k − 1)(A+B + C +N0), ∀k ∈ K, ∀i ∈ L (30)
As a result, we have a linear programming problem, as all of the constraints and the objective function are linear.
The achievable individual secrecy rate for Bk satisfies the following inequality:
Rk ≤ [I(Sk;YBk)− I(Sk;ZEi)]+, ∀i ∈ L (31)
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Therefore, instead of separate secrecy requirements as in (26d) and (26e), Bobs may request a certain individual
secrecy rate. In particular, the constraints in (26d) and (26e) can be replaced as follows:
minimize
PSk ∀k∈K
P (j)m ∀m∈M
PBk ∀k∈K
∑
k∈K
PSk +
∑
m∈M
P (j)m +
∑
k∈K
PBk (32a)
s.t.
∑
k∈K
PSk +
∑
m∈M
P (j)m ≤ P¯A (32b)
PBk ≤ P¯Bk , ∀k ∈ K (32c)
I(Sk;YBk)− I(Sk;ZEi) ≥ Rk, ∀k ∈ K, ∀i ∈ L (32d)
where Rk is a nonnegative individual secrecy rate. However, this makes the problem non-convex. Here, the same
problem formulation in (26) can be used for a given set of randomization rate values Rxk . Note that, Rxk is
“the designed randomization rate” that confuses Eves, and the problem reduces to choosing optimal amount of
randomization to minimize the total power consumption while satisfying the individual secrecy rate requirements.
It can be found by a line search method.
Note that even if the CSI of Bobs and the corresponding Eves is correlated, the same analysis holds. The other
issue is how to ensure that Bobs generate the RxFJ signals as designed at Alice, as they are not trustworthy devices.
The objective of sending an RxFJ signal from each Bob is to provide security only around that Bob (i.e., the power
of the RxFJ signal is limited by design). Therefore, Bobs are not supposed to help each other. Even if Bobs rely on
each other to degrade Eves, Alice computes how much power Bobs should allocate to their RxFJ signals, as she is
the only one who has all the necessary parameters (e.g., CSI) to solve the optimization problem. A given Bob does
not exactly know whether his RxFJ can harm other Bobs. Even if some of Bobs behave in an adversarial manner
by using their RxFJ signal for malicious (jamming) purposes, they can be easily detected by Alice, and prevented
from transmitting (note that such active-attack model is not part of our underlying setup).
B. Unknown ECSI
In this section, we assume that the first- and second-order statistics of the ECSI are known, not the ECSI itself.
How Alice obtains the perfect CSI between Bobs and herself in an 802.11ac network is explained in the previous
section. However, after the last acquisition of perfect CSI for a given Eve, she may move to another location or
the small-scale effects of her channel may change. As a result, some perturbation relative to the last known CSI of
this Eve can be assumed. Based on this information, Alice can estimate Eve’s channel statistics. Specifically, we
assume that Alice knows
KAEi = E[h
∗
AEi
hAEi ] (33)
µBkEi = E[h
∗
BkEi
hBkEi ] (34)
∀i ∈ L and ∀k ∈ K. We consider replacing the randomization rate constraint in (26e) with an outage constraint for
all Bobs, as ECSI is random. The probability of having at least one Eve such that the mutual information between
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the received signal at this Eve and the information signal, Sk, is greater than or equal to the designed randomization
rate, Rxk , is called the outage probability for the kth Bob. The outage constraint states that the outage probability
should be smaller than or equal to a certain constant ǫk for the kth Bob. Particularly, if there exists only one Eve,
i.e. L = 1, this constraint is given by:
Pr{I(Sk;ZE1) ≥ Rxk} ≤ ǫk, ∀k ∈ K (35)
In the presence of L non-colluding Eves, this outage probability becomes:
1− (1− Pr{I(Sk;ZEi) ≥ Rxk})L ≤ ǫk, ∀k ∈ K, i ∈ L (36)
Pr{I(Sk;ZEi) ≥ Rxk} ≤ 1− L
√
1− ǫk, ∀k ∈ K, i ∈ L (37)
where we assume all Eves have the same channel properties, and the channels between Alice and each Eve
are independent. (The inequality in (37) is identical to the one in (35) when L = 1.) Note that this indepen-
dence assumption brings about the worst-case scenario. (Otherwise, the right hand side of the inequality in (37)
would take a larger value, so satisfying the outage probability constraint would be easier.) Therefore, it does
not contradict the assumption that the CSI of Bobs and the corresponding Eves is correlated. By integrating the
equation in (28) into this outage probability expression, we obtain the first and the second equalities in (39) where
D =
∑
l∈{K\k} PSlv
∗
l h
∗
AEi
hAEivl, F =
∑
m∈M P
(j)
m (v
(j)
m )∗h∗AEihAEiv
(j)
m , and G =
∑
k∈K PBkh
∗
BkEi
hBkEi .
Nevertheless, it is not possible to obtain a tractable problem by using this outage constraint. Thus, we exploit
Markov’s inequality, which states the following:
Pr{X ≥ a} ≤ E[X ]
a
(38)
where a > E[X ]. Therefore, the outage expression can be upper-bounded using Markov’s inequality as in the
third expression in (39). By assuming the channels are zero mean, this is modified as in the forth expression,
where D¯ =
∑
l∈{K\k} PSlv
∗
lKAEivl, F¯ =
∑
m∈M P
(j)
m (v
(j)
m )∗KAEiv
(j)
m , and G¯ =
∑
k∈K PBkµBkEi . Note that
a similar inequality can be written for channels with non-zero mean. As a result, the constraint (37) is converted
to the constraint in the last equation of (39) for all k ∈ K. (The upper bound obtained by Markov’s inequality is
used for outage probability, so the analysis here is on the conservative side. One can utilize tighter bounds like
Chebyshev’s or Chernoff’s inequalities, but we do not pursue this here. We note that a similar Markov bound was
used in [32].)
If the CSI of the kth Bob and the ith Eve is correlated with parameter ρki, the analysis is modified as follows.
The relationship between hAEi and hABk =
√
DABkgABk becomes:
hAEi =
√
DAEi(ρkigABk +
√
1− ρ2kigAEi) (40)
where gAEi and gABk are independent of each other, i.e., hAEi =
√
DAEigAEi when ρki = 0. Therefore, the
covariance matrix KAEi is formed by:
KAEi = E[h
∗
AEi
hAEi ] (41)
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Pr{I(Sk;ZEi) ≥ Rxk} = Pr{log(1 +
PSkv
∗
kh
∗
AEi
hAEivk
D + F +G+ 1
) ≥ Rxk}
= Pr{PSkv∗kh∗AEihAEivk − (2R
x
k − 1)(D + F +G) ≥ 2Rxk − 1}
≤ E[PSkv
∗
kh
∗
AEi
hAEivk − (2R
x
k − 1)(D + F +G)]
2R
x
k − 1
=
PSkv
∗
kKAEivk − (2R
x
k − 1)(D¯ + F¯ + G¯)
2R
x
k − 1
PSkv
∗
kKAEivk − (2R
x
k − 1)(D¯ + F¯ + G¯)
2R
x
k − 1 ≤ 1−
L
√
1− ǫk (39)
= E[DAEi(ρkigABk +
√
1− ρ2kigAEi)∗(ρkigABk +
√
1− ρ2kigAEi)] (42)
= E[DAEiρ
2
kig
∗
ABk
gABk ] + E[DAEi(1− ρ2ki)g∗AEigAEi] + E[2DAEiρki
√
1− ρ2ki R{g∗ABkgAEi}] (43)
= ρ2kig
∗
ABk
gABkE[DAEi ] + (1− ρ2ki)E[DAEi ]E[g∗AEigAEi ] + 2ρki
√
1− ρ2kiE[DAEi ] R{h∗ABkE[gAEi ]}
(44)
= ρ2kig
∗
ABk
gABkE[DAEi ] + (1− ρ2ki)E[DAEi ]INA (45)
where R{.} represents the real part of a complex number. The equation (44) follows that gABk is a known vector,
which is small-scale channel effects between Alice and the kth Bob, and DAEi and gAEi are independent random
variables. Furthermore, the last equality follows that E[gAEi ] = 0 and E[g∗AEigAEi ] = INA , as gAEi ∼ CN (0, INA).
The first- and second-order statistics of DAEi are known as explained before, so KAEi can be estimated by (45).
Obtaining the exact correlation coefficient is not possible, if ECSI is unknown. Therefore, this correlation coefficient
can be treated as a controllable security metric. For example, Bobs may request a certain correlation coefficient
based on the secrecy level they would like to achieve (e.g., if Bobs assume that there is another device nearby, they
request a higher correlation coefficient). Similarly, Alice may guarantee secure communication for Bobs only up to
a certain level of correlation for a given ǫk. Note that there is a tradeoff between correlation coefficient and outage
probability. If Bobs request Alice to use a larger ρki to increase the secrecy level, it will be harder to satisfy the
outage probability. In this case, Alice may not find a feasible solution, and she needs to increase ǫk to relax the
outage probability constraint. As we previously assume that all Eves have the same channel properties, the second
subscript of the correlation coefficient can be omitted, i.e., ρki = ρk ∀i ∈ L. Consequently, the outage probability
constraint is given by (39) where KAEi is calculated using (45).
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
We simulate an 802.11ac network in a simplified manner, using some of its system parameters. The coherence
time of the channels is large enough so that Alice perfectly acquires the CSI of Bobs and Eves via previously
explained channel estimation techniques. Therefore, within each coherence interval (or transmission block), the
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channels are constant, whereas at the beginning of each coherence interval, the channels from i ∈ {A ∪ B} to
j ∈ {B ∪ E} are randomly generated as
hij = gij
√
A(
c
4πfdij
)3 (46)
where A, c, f , and dij are the antenna gain, speed of light, operating center frequency, and distance between the
corresponding devices, respectively. (A is assumed to be the same between each i-j pair.) This is a modified version
of the simplest form of Friis transmission equation. gij ∼ CN (0, INA) represents small-scale effects of the channel.
We set A to 4 and f to 5260 MHz throughout the simulations, while the frequency bandwidth is 160 MHz. The
maximum power outputs at Alice, P¯A, and each receiver, P¯Bk ∀k ∈ K, are 24 dBm and 10 dBm, respectively. The
thermal noise for 160 MHz bandwidth is −95 dBm. The number of antennas at Alice, NA, is set to 8, and she can
serve at most 4 Bobs simultaneously. We assume that Bobs and Eves are uniformly and randomly distributed in a
circular area around Alice with a radius of 30 meters unless otherwise stated. We show the average value of 2000
different realizations of the network in the simulation results.
A. Known ECSI
ZFBF and cooperative FJ (CFJ) techniques are introduced in Sections III-A and III-B, respectively. Fig. 2 shows
the performance evaluation of these techniques and TxFJ (without using RxFJ) with known ECSI in terms of power
consumption for the given individual secrecy rates. The problem given in (32) is solved, when all of Bobs demand
the same individual secrecy rate, i.e. Rk = Rl ∀k, l ∈ K. (This problem is formulated for CFJ. However, the same
formulation can be used to solve TxFJ problem as well, when Bobs have no power for RxFJ.) 3 Bobs and 3 Eves
are assumed to be present. In Fig. 2a, they are randomly and uniformly located around Alice as specified before.
In this case, there is no correlation between the channels of Bobs and Eves. In Figs. 2b, 2c, and 2d, Bobs are
located similarly. However, each Eve randomly selects one of Bobs, and she is randomly and uniformly located in
a circular area around him with a radius of 1 meter (no closer than 10 cm). The correlations between the channels
of Bobs and the corresponding Eves are 0, 0.4, and 0.9 in Figs. 2b, 2c, and 2d, respectively. Furthermore, to
observe the effect of SIS, three different values of α are considered as follows. The self-interference channel is
modeled as hBkBk = 1 ∀k ∈ K. If Bobs use all of their powers, the self-interference becomes 10 dBm without
any suppression. When α = 0, the self-interference is assumed to be negligible compared to the noise floor, which
is −95 dBm. When α is equal to 1.0e− 8 or 1.0e− 6, the self-interference becomes −70 dBm (corresponding to
80 dB suppression) or −50 dBm (corresponding to 60 dB suppression), respectively. (Note that 60 dB suppression
can be easily achieved employing the full-duplex radio design techniques in the literature [27], [33]–[35].)
Fig. 2a shows that ZFBF outperforms the other schemes for the given setup, when Bobs and Eves are indepen-
dently located. Moreover, the performances of TxFJ and CFJ are identical, which means that RxFJ is not employed
in this case (it is not optimal). The performance of TxFJ and ZFBF does not change, when Bobs have nearby
Eves as in Fig. 2b, since the channels of Bobs and Eves are still independent. However, CFJ with high SIS starts
outperforming TxFJ and ZFBF. Employing RxFJ becomes optimal, as Eves are closer to Bobs. When ρ = 0.4 as
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(a) Independently located Bobs and Eves
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(b) Independently located Bobs with nearby Eves (ρ = 0)
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(c) Independently located Bobs with nearby Eves (ρ = 0.4)
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(d) Independently located Bobs with nearby Eves (ρ = 0.9)
Fig. 2: Total power consumption vs. individual secrecy rate with known ECSI where K = 3 and L = 3.
in Fig. 2c, power consumption of all schemes slightly increases. The performance gain of CFJ (with high SIS)
relative to others also increases. In Fig. 2d, a high channel correlation case is investigated. The performance of
CFJ with high SIS is much better than TxFJ and ZFBF. Indeed, power consumption of CFJ does not change much
with ρ, as a small amount of power for RxFJ signals is adequate to satisfy the individual secrecy rate constraints.
On the other hand, TxFJ and ZFBF need to spend much more power in high channel correlation case. (There is a
discrepancy in Fig. 2d, as there is no feasible solution for TxFJ most of the time.)
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(a) Independently located Bobs and Eves
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(b) Independently located Bobs with nearby Eves (ρ = 0)
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(c) Independently located Bobs with nearby Eves (ρ = 0.4)
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(d) Independently located Bobs with nearby Eves (ρ = 0.9)
Fig. 3: Total power consumption vs. individual secrecy rate with unknown ECSI where K = 3, L = 3, and ǫ = 0.01.
B. Unknown ECSI
In Fig. 3, we show the performance of using CFJ in the scenarios where ECSI is unknown. As ZFBF cannot
be used without the knowledge of the channels, CFJ with different levels of SIS and TxFJ are compared with
each others. The same system setup given in the previous section is used, while ǫk = 0.01 ∀k ∈ K. (Note that
the individual secrecy outage probability should be less than or equal to ǫk). Again, when Bobs and Eves are
independently located, CFJ and TxFJ have the same performance (RxFJ is not employed). However, when Bobs
have Eves in their vicinity, CFJ outperforms TxFJ. While the correlation of the channels between Bobs and the
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corresponding Eves is increasing, the performance gain of employing RxFJ also increases. Unlike the known ECSI
case, when α = 1.0e− 8, CFJ is still much better than TxFJ. (Again, the discrepancy in Fig. 3d is due to obtaining
unfeasible solutions most of the time in TxFJ scheme.)
C. User Scheduling
So far, all of K Bobs were served without considering any scheduling scheme so that they could achieve the
given individual secrecy rate requirements instantaneously, i.e., at each transmission time. Here, we investigate
whether the total power consumption can be reduced further by serving a subset of Bobs, while achieving the
individual secrecy rate requirements of each Bob on average. Let the probability that Alice serves the kth Bob in
the given transmission block be pk. Accordingly, the kth Bob requires p−1k times more individual secrecy rate per
transmission block than the one in the previous sections, when he is served. We propose to select the closest T
Bobs to Alice in this paper, while KT denotes the set of indices belonging to the selected T Bobs. The rest of Bobs
are treated as Eves with known CSI, i.e., the total number of Eves becomes L+K − T . The problem formulation
in (32) is modified as follows:
minimize
PSk ∀k∈KT
P (j)m ∀m∈M
PBk ∀k∈KT
∑
k∈KT
PSk +
∑
m∈M
P (j)m +
∑
k∈KT
PBk (47a)
s.t.
∑
k∈KT
PSk +
∑
m∈M
P (j)m ≤ P¯A (47b)
PBk ≤ P¯Bk , ∀k ∈ KT (47c)
I(Sk;YBk)− I(Sk;ZEi) ≥ p−1k Rk, ∀k ∈ KT , ∀i ∈ {L ∪ K \ KT } (47d)
In the performance evaluation, we average the results over locations of Bobs and Eves. Locations are constant
for a transmission block, and they are randomly and uniformly chosen between blocks. (We didn’t incorporate a
mobility scheme that models a more realistic network model, as this is not the scope of this paper. However, it
can be thought as Bobs are moving very fast so that the topology completely and independently changes at each
block.) Therefore, pk = T/K ∀k ∈ K.
We compare the results of such a scheduling scheme in Figs. 4a and 4b. Different Bobs are selected for each
communication block, as a different topology is created each time. Fig. 4a is obtained for the case of known ECSI,
where ρ = 0, α = 0, K = 4, and L = 3. Number of scheduled (active) Bobs, T , at a given time is showed
in the legend. Note that the x-axis represents the average individual secrecy rate over 4 Bobs. (Horizontal bars
indicate standard deviation of the achieved rates. We note that the number of repetitions, which is 3000, is enough
to have almost equal rates in the long term.) In the low and high power regime, the proposed scheduling scheme
(transmitting to fewer Bobs) outperforms the regular one (transmitting to all of Bobs). However, between some
threshold points, transmitting to 3 Bobs consumes less power than transmitting to 2 or 4 Bobs. On the other hand,
Fig. 4b shows that the regular scheme always has a better performance, when Eves are located around Bobs, and
the channel correlation coefficient between Bobs and the corresponding Eves is equal to 0.9. In this case, selecting
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Fig. 4: Total power consumption vs. individual secrecy rate with known ECSI where K = 4 and L = 3.
the closest Bobs to Alice makes the performance worse, as Eves are also close to Alice due to the assumption that
they are in the vicinity of Bobs. Similar results are obtained for the unknown ECSI case.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered the scenario where a transmitter sends K independent confidential data streams,
intended to K legitimate receivers in the presence of L eavesdroppers. With the knowledge that the security
applications require guard zones around receivers up to 19 wavelengths, we proposed using RxFJ along with TxFJ.
That way, even if an eavesdropper has a highly correlated channel with that of any legitimate receiver and is able
to cancel out TxFJ, RxFJ keeps facilitating confidentiality for the information signals. To be able to send RxFJ
from the receivers, we considered FD receivers. These receivers are capable of partial/complete self-interference
suppression. We used zero-forcing beamforming technique not only to remove the TxFJ interference at intended
receivers but also to hide the information signals from the unintended receivers. We showed how to design practical
precoders for information signals and TxFJ signals. We formulated a minimum power allocation problem to the
information, TxFJ, and RxFJ signals under certain secrecy rate requirements. We solved this problem with/without
the knowledge of eavesdropper’s CSI. The results showed that using RxFJ together with TxFJ increases the system
performance in multiuser MISO systems, especially when the eavesdropper channels are correlated with that of the
legitimate receivers.
Throughout this paper, only Bobs had FD capabilities. We note that if Eves had such FD capabilities as well,
they would be able to send jamming signals to decrease the SINR at Bobs, while simultaneously eavesdropping
the information messages over the same frequency. Problems that arise from this model are left for future studies.
We also initiated a study of scheduling schemes (here, based on the distance between Alice and Bobs) to further
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decrease the power consumption. The results showed that under certain conditions, different scheduling methods
increase the performance. The effect of other scheduling strategies in the context of secret communications will be
reported elsewhere.
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